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Abstract
The axioms of expected utility and discounted utility theory have been tested
extensively. In contrast, the axioms of social welfare functions have only been
tested in a few questionnaire studies involving choices between hypothetical
income distributions. In this note, we conduct a controlled experiment with
100 subjects in the role of social planners that tests ve fundamental properties
of social welfare functions to provide a basic test of cardinal social choice theory.
We nd that four properties of the standard social welfare functions tested are
systematically violated, producing an Allais paradox, a common ratio eect,
a framing eect, and a skewness eect in social choice. We also develop a
model of salience based social choice which predicts these systematic deviations
and highlights the close relationship between these anomalies and the classical
paradoxes for risk and time.
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1

Introduction

The neo-classical models of decision making for risk and time  the expected utility
and discounted utility theories, have been carefully tested for over half a century.
The neo-classical models of social choice have received much less systematic empirical study. While there is a voluminous literature on social preference experiments
that focus on tradeos between self-interest and other-regarding behavior (e.g., Roth
(1995), Cooper and Kagel (2014) and the references therein), and a sizeable literature exists on tradeos between equality and eciency (e.g., Engelmann and Strobel,
2004), to our knowledge, there has not been an incentivized experimental study that
tests the basic axioms of cardinal social choice theory upon which the concept of a
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social welfare function is founded .
In this note, we directly test ve properties that are satised by prominent social
welfare functions. Three of these properties apply generally to the standard model
(Moulin, 2004) which consists of the class of all additive social welfare functions. The
fourth property applies to the special case of power social welfare functions and the
fth property to the special case of the utilitarian social welfare function.
To generate our test questions, we construct a simple and psychologically grounded
model of a salience-based social planner. This model extends Leland and Schneider's
(2018) model of Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations (SWUP) which provides
a unied explanation for anomalies occurring in choices under risk and over time as
arising from the same properties of salience perception.
We then place experimental subjects in the roles of social planners whose choices
will be implemented with some probability to test the axiomatic foundations of traditional social choice models and the predictions of the newly developed salience model.
Specically, our study tests four basic axioms implicit in traditional social choice theories and an additional property implied by the utilitarian model to reveal other factors
aecting social choices such as framing and skewness preference. In our experiment,
we observe strong and systematic violations of traditional social choice theory for four
of the ve properties we test. Each of the modal responses is predicted by the new
parameter-free salience model. Our results reveal anomalies for social choice theory
that are analogous to the classical anomalies for choices under risk and over time.

1 Questionnaire

studies using scenarios with hypothetical income distributions had the structure
of the Allais paradox (Bernasconi (2002), Bosmans and Schokkaert (2004), and Michaelson (2015)).
All these studies found support for an Allais paradox in social choice.
2
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Principles of Cardinal Welfare Theory

We consider choices made by a social planner over allocations of resources.
there be a nite set,

A : I → U,

U,

of outcomes and a nite set of individuals,

n(x )

assigns an outcome to each individual where

viduals allocated outcome

x ∈ U.

I.

Let

An allocation,

is the number of indi-

Choices under risk and over time have been shown

to be subject to systematic framing eects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Magen
et al., 2008) in which informationally equivalent representations of the same choice
alternatives produce large preference reversals. To test for the possibility of framing
eects in social choice, we provide a formalization of the principle of frame invariance.
To do so, let
uals,

n,

A := (x,n)

x, and a vector of individni individuals are allocated

consist of a vector of outcomes,

over which outcomes are distributed, such that

xi . Dene B := (y, m) analogously. If A generates
allocation A, we say that A is a representation of A. Note

outcome

the same distribution as
that there can be many

representations of the same allocation by rearranging the order of the elements of

A

or by splitting or combining numbers of individuals who are allocated the same

outcome. Using italicized font to denote allocations and bold font for representations
of allocations, denote the set of allocations by
of allocations by
of

U

F.

F.

Denote the set of representations

Strictly speaking, in classical social choice theory, the elements

are utilities. We label them neutrally as outcomes. In our experiment, the out-

comes will be small amounts of money to be distributed among participants which we
implicitly use instead of unobservable utilities and which can plausibly be considered
to have a common value for the subjects in our experiment.
The standard model in social choice theory assumes that society (or a `social planner') decides how to allocate resources by choosing among utility proles to maximize

I , of individuals, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k }, and
u := (u1 , ..., uk ), the standard cardinal social welfare

a social welfare function. For a set,
a corresponding utility prole,
functioon,

W,

can be represented as (1):

X

W (u) =

w(ui ),

(1)

i∈I
where

ui

is the utility that individual

i

receives from utility prole

u,

and

w

is

a social welfare function. Moulin (2004) provides a textbook treatment of cardinal
welfare theory and discusses the standard power social welfare function,
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w (ui ) = uiα

for

α > 0,

which has several noteworthy special cases: When

α = 1,

it reduces to the

utilitarian social welfare function that maximizes the sum of utilities. In the limit as

α

appraoches 0, this specication converges to

w (ui ) = ln(ui )

which is equivalent to

the Nash social welfare function that maximizes the product of utilities. For

α < 1,

the social welfare function incorporates a form of inequality aversion.
Formula (1) can be derived from assuming a social planner has complete and
transitive preferences that satisfy continuity, symmetry, monotonicity, and an independence axiom (Moulin, 2004). The independence axiom can be stated analogously
to the independence axiom of expected utility theory which implies the properties of
common consequence independence and common ratio independence. The standard
model also implicitly satises a basic property of frame invariance. The most commonly used class of social welfare functions additionally satises a scale invariance
axiom (Moulin, 2004). These properties, stated below, are tested in our experiment.

(u, n; u 0 , n 0 ) denote an allocation (utility prole) in which n individuals receive
0
0
0
0
00
00
utility u and n individuals receive utility u . Dene allocation (u, n; u , n ; u , n )
analogously. Let % represent the preference ordering of a social planner over allocations. Let %̂ be a preference relation dened over representations of allocations. If %
can be represented by any additive social welfare function as in (1), then % satises
properties 1, 2, and 3, below. If, in addition, % can be represented by a power social
welfare function, then % also satises property 4. If, in addition, % can be represented
by the utilitarian social welfare function, then % also satises property 5:
Let

1.

2.

Common Consequence Independence:

For all

Common Ratio Independence:

u, u 0 , v , v 0 ∈ U,

u, u 0 , v , v 0 , x , y ∈ U,
(u, n; u 0 , n 0 ; x , k ) % (v , n; v 0 , n 0 ; x , k ) ⇒ (u, n; u 0 , n 0 ; y, k ) % (v , n; v 0 , n 0 ; y, k ).
For all

any

λ ∈ [0, 1],

and

m, m 0 > 0 such that m + m 0 = n :
(u, n) % (v , m; v 0 , m 0 ) ⇒ (u, λn; u 0 , (1 − λ)n) % (v , λm; v 0 , λm 0 ; u 0 , (1 − λ)(n)).
any

3.

Frame Invariance:

4.

Scale Invariance:

5.

For representations

A

of

A, B

of

B , A % B ⇒ A%̂B.

u, u 0 , v , v 0 ∈ U, any λ > 0,
(u, n; u 0 , n 0 ) % (v , m; v 0 , m 0 ) ⇒ (λu, n; λu 0 , n 0 ) % (λv , m; λv 0 , m 0 ).
For all

Skewness Invariance:

n > n 0 . Then for all u, u 0 , v , v 0 , w , w 0 ∈ U,
0
0
0 0
0 0
that w > u > w > u , and un + u n = wn + w n :
(u, n, u 0 , n 0 ) % (v , m; v 0 , m 0 ) ⇒ (w , n; w 0 , n 0 ) % (v , m; v 0 , m 0 ).
Let
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such

Property 1 states that exchanging a common outcome in which
utility

x

with a common outcome in which

not aect the social planner's preferences.

k

k

individuals receive

individuals receive utility

y

should

Property 2 implies that mixing two al-

locations with the same common allocation should not aect the social planner's
preferences.

Property 3 implies that the social planner's preferences between two

allocations should not be aected by informationally equivalent representations of
the allocations.

Property 4 implies that scaling all outcomes by a constant factor

should not aect the social planner's preferences. Property 5 implies that replacing a
negatively skewed allocation with a positively skewed allocation that distributes the
same total surplus should not aect the social planner's preferences.
A test of principles 1  5 above enables us to investigate the formal properties of
utilitarian preferences (and more generally, any additive social welfare function) to
determine the empirical validity of the standard social choice theory. Of course, while
our study takes an empirical approach to social choice theory, it cannot contradict
the normative or philosophical views that social welfare functions should have one
particular form or another. However, the empirical approach is particularly suited to
address the questions regarding how people actually prefer to allocate resources among
individuals which cannot be answered from a normative or philosophical perspective.

3

A Salience-based Model of Social Choice

Several recent papers have explored the possibility that choice behavior is inuenced
by the perceived salience of the attributes of alternatives in a choice set.
et al.

Bordalo

(2012), for example, propose a model to explain anomalies in risky choice

in which attention is focused on salient payos.

Bordalo et al.

(2013) consider a

model of salience-based consumer choice. Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) present a model
of focusing in intertemporal choice in which people over-weight salient attributes
of choice alternatives. Leland and Schneider's (2018) salience weighted utility over
presentations (SWUP) model provides an explanation for violations of both expected
utility and discounted utility theory as arising from the same mathematical structure
and the same psychological intuition.
This note extends the modelling approach of SWUP to predict how salience affects the behavior of a social planner who chooses between dierent social welfare
allocations over individuals. This salience model is not a general alternative to the
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standard social choice models but rather a complementary device for generating predictions regarding how salience perception aects social choice. We use it to generate
the set of choices employed in our experiment. We highlight the fact that the salience
model was developed prior to the experiment rather than the more common approach
in which a theory is developed ex post to t the experimental data.
To proceed, we adapt the denition of a frame that Leland, Schneider, and Wilcox
(2018) employed for choices involving risk and time:

Denition 1 (Frame):

A presentation or frame

is a matrix containing a representation

A

of

A

A generic frame is presented in Figure 1.

JA,BK

A
B.

of allocations,

and a representation

B

of

and

B,

Neoclassical economics implicitly as-

sumes that preferences are invariant to equivalent representations of alternatives.
However, the choices of an agent whose decisions are inuenced by salience considerations may depend on the frame to the extent it determines what attribute values
are compared and which are found to be salient.

i ∈ I values resources according to the
th
utility function u(xi ) = xj , for all j where j ∈ {1, ..., J} indexes the location of the j
Consider a society where each individual,

outcome in the frame in Figure 1. The assumption of linear utility is perhaps most
natural for comparing income distributions, and it serves as a useful approximation
that enables one to measure social surplus from observable information (income distributions) rather than from unobservable heterogeneous utility functions. Given a
choice between allocations A and B (From Figure 1), a utilitarian social planner
satises (2):

A % B ⇐⇒

J
X

nj xj ≥

j=1
Next, consider the relation
tual relation' where

A%̂B

%̂

J
X

mj yj .

(2)

j=1

over representations. We refer to

is interpreted as
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A

%̂

as a 'percep-

looks 'at least as good as'

B

given

representation

A

of

A

and

B

of

B.

Utilitarian preferences can also be represented by the perceptual relation in (3):

A%̂B ⇐⇒

J
X

nj xj ≥

j=1

J
X

mj yj .

(3)

j=1

Note that (3) can be written equivalently as a comparative model such that

A%̂B

if and only if:

J
X

[(nj − mj )(xj + yj )/2 + (xj − yj )(nj + mj )/2] ≥ 0.

(4)

j=1
Formula (4) weights attribute dierences by their average utility and weights utility dierences by their average attribute value. We formalize systematic deviations
from (4) by letting tradeos between alternatives receive `salience weights' to reect
the attention allocated to each comparison in the frame. Drawing on the intuition that
larger dierences attract disproportionate attention and are thereby over-weighted,

φ(nj ,mj ) on dierences in the numbers of individuals,
dierences such that A%̂B if and only if (5) holds:

we incorporate salience weights
and

µ(xj ,yj )

J
X

on utility

[φ(nj ,mj )(nj − mj )(xj + yj )/2 + µ(xj ,yj )(xj − yj )(nj + mj )/2] ≥ 0.

(5)

j=1
We refer to this model as salience weighted utility over presentations (SWUP).
Analogous SWUP models to (5) that derive SWUP for risk from generalizing expected
utility theory and that derive SWUP for choice over time from generalizing discounted
utility theory are provided in Leland and Schneider (2018). We refer to an agent who
chooses according to (5) as a focal thinker since such an agent focuses on salient
dierences in attribute values. Since SWUP is frame-dependent, its predictions are
tested in a conditional sense, given the frame.

The application of SWUP to our

experiment implicitly assumes that subjects frame the allocation decisions as they
are presented to them. While this observation and the fact that (5) is only specied
for binary choice limit the generality of the model, we reiterate that our focus is on
testing standard social choice theory and comparing the implications of the standard
model with the implications of salience for social choice. To this end, (5) provides
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a simple way to generate testable predictions for how salience aects social choices.
We also note that SWUP is quite general in a dierent sense  it generates testable
predictions across the domains of risk, time, and social choice.

3.1 Properties of Salience Perception
The salience functions

μ and φ determine the only ways in which a focal thinker diers

from a rational agent. We assume a salience function exhibits two properties:

Denition 2 (Salience Function (Bordalo et al., 2013)):
σ(a,b)

A salience function

is any (non-negative), symmetric, and continuous function that satises the

following two properties:
1.

Ordering:

2.

Diminishing Sensitivity:

If

[a0 ,b0 ] ⊂ [a,b]

then

σ(a0 ,b0 ) < σ(a,b).

For any

a, b,  > 0, σ(a+,b + ) < σ(a,b).

Ordering implies that the dierence between values spanning a smaller interval (such
as $30 vs.

$40) is less salient than a dierence spanning a larger interval which

contains the smaller interval (such as $10 vs.

$50).

Diminishing sensitivity (DS),

known since the work of Weber and Fechner in the 19th century, implies that for a
xed dierence in values, the perceptual system is more sensitive to larger ratios. For
instance, DS implies that the comparison between $1 and $100 is more salient than
$101 versus $200. To illustrate a simple and tractable special case of SWUP, we use a
parameter-free specication of (5) in which

μ(x, y)

and

φ(n, m)

are given by salience

function (6) proposed by Bordalo et al., (2013) that satises ordering and diminishing
sensitivity. We impose (6) when it is not the case that
set

a = b = 0,

and we otherwise

σv(0, 0)= 0.
σ(a,b) =

|a − b|
.
|a| + |b|

(6)

Formula (6) is perhaps the simplest function satisfying ordering and DS. It is
also a special case of a formula for visual contrast that is used in computational
neuroscience

2

(Mante et al., 2005; Carandini and Heeger, 2012).

2 For

Hence, the same

instance, Carandini and Heeger (2012) dene local contrast as C = (L − Lm )/Lm where L is
local light intensity and Lm is the mean light intensity. When there are only two light intensities, x
and y, with x > y > 0, note that C = [x − (0.5x + 0.5y)]/(0.5x + 0.5y) = (x − y)/(x + y). Mante et
al. (2005) use a related formula for the local contrast between pixels in an image that includes (6)
as a special case.
8

function used to measure visual contrast between two pixels in an image is used
under SWUP to measure `tradeo contrast' between two attributes in a frame. The
parameter-free specication of SWUP thus has a strong psychological foundation.
Throughout, we illustrate the SWUP model for social choice using formula (5)
with salience function (6). For any given frame, this specication of SWUP has no
free parameters. We refer to (5, 6) as our parameter-free specication of SWUP.

4

Experimental Design

To test whether the fundamental properties of social choice theories are violated
in practice, our experimental design involved allocation decisions using a procedure
similar to Engelmann and Strobel (2004) in which there are multiple recipients and
the decision maker is a social planner whose payo is constant across allocations.
The framework of this experiment diers from that of Engelman and Strobel (2004)
in that they did not test the basic axioms of social choice theory but rather focused
on the tradeo between minimizing equality and maximizing eciency.
One hundred undergraduate students at a private California university were randomly recruited to participate in the experiment. Each student participated in one
session, with twenty students per session. Sessions were held in the experimental laboratory at the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University. The laboratory
contains four rows of computer terminals with each computer in a separate cubicle.
Five students were seated in each row, with one student per cubicle. Students read
the instructions and proceeded through the experiment at their own pace. The experimental materials are provided as screen shots in the supplementary material (SM).
Students were not able to see the identities or choices of other students.

Students

each had a post-it note with a number between 1 and 20 at their computers.
Each student made ten choices between monetary allocations to be allocated
among ten students in the room.

The ten choice sets were designed to test the

potential for anomalous decisions within the social choice framework. Students were
informed that one choice from one student in the third or fourth rows would be randomly selected to determine the allocation for the students in the rst and second
rows and that one choice from one student in the rst and second rows would be randomly selected to determine the allocation for the students in the third and fourth
rows. Students could not be recipients of their own allocation decisions so as not to
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confound a student's own risk preferences with her social preferences. The identities
of all students including those whose choices determined the actual allocation were
kept anonymous.
The experiment was programmed in Qualtrics.

The order of the ten allocation

decisions and the allocation presented in the top or bottom row of each decision
were both randomized within subjects.

Students earned $10 for participation ($7

as a `show-up' payment and $3 for responding to all questions) in addition to their
payment from the selected allocation.

Potential payments ranged between $0 and

$50. Following the ten allocation choices, the experiment concluded with the sevenquestion cognitive reection test (CRT) due to Toplak et al. (2014) which extends
the original CRT from Frederick (2005). The CRT was used to determine if students'
cognitive reection skills are related to the consistency of their allocation decisions
with social choice theory.
Once all students completed their responses, one choice was randomly selected
to be implemented for the students in the front two rows using a ten-sided die and
another choice was randomly selected to be implemented for students in the back two
rows. Two more rolls of the ten-sided die selected one student from the back two rows
(one from the front two rows) whose choice in the selected decision would determine
the allocation to be implemented for the students in the front two rows (back two
rows).
Two opaque bags were each lled with ten slips of paper prior to the experiment.
One bag had slips numbered 1 through 10, the other had slips numbered 11 through
20.

After the allocations were determined for both groups of students, slips were

randomly drawn from each bag to implement the selected allocation with prizes from
that allocation assigned in monotonically decreasing order to the student with the
number on the post-it note that corresponded to the slip drawn. A typical session
lasted less than half an hour.

4.1 Allocation Choices used in the Experiment
The ten allocation decisions made by subjects collectively test the ve properties
in Section 2. By testing these properties, we can test the extent to which subjects
conform to the following nested social choice models (with properties they satisfy in
parentheses):
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1. The class of additive social welfare functions (Properties (1-3)
2. The class of additive power social welfare functions (Properties (1-4)
3. The utilitarian social welfare function (Properties (1-5)
The salience model in (5) with salience function (6) predicts that preferences will
systematically deviate from properties (1-3) and property (5) but will conform to
property (6). Under the more general salience function in Bordalo et al. (2012) given
by

σ(a,b) = |a − b/(|a| + |b| + θ),

from all ve properties.

the salience model predicts systematic deviations

In particular formula (5), with either the parameter-free

salience function (6) or the more general salience function (for example, with

θ = 1),

predicts:
1. deviations from common consequence independence that are analogous to the
Allais paradox in risky choice.
2. deviations from common ratio independence that mirror the certainty eect in
risky choice.
3. systematic framing eects in which preferences shift toward the more egalitarian
allocation or the more utilitarian allocation, depending on which tradeos are
salient that mirror alignment framing eects in risky choice.
4. skewness preference in which preferences are attracted to positively skewed allocations and averse to negatively skewed allocations that is consistent with the
tendency toward skewness preference in risky choice.
The SWUP model in (5) generates dierent predictions for the parameter-free and the
more general salience functions (for example, with

θ = 1) when testing the property of

scale invariance. While the parameter-free salience function predicts scale invariance
to hold, the more general salience function generates a magnitude eect in which
preferences shift from inequality-seeking to inequality-averse as payos are scaled up.
Testing the property of scale invariance thereby enables us to distinguish between the
two primary salience functions in the literature.
Our simple experiment thus enables us to test the standard model of social choice
theory while also permitting us to test the implications of salience perception for
social choice.

The ten allocation decisions from the experiment are presented in

the following subsections with the predicted choices highlighted in bold. All choices
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(presented as shown to subjects in the SM) were displayed in words rather than in
the matrix form in Figure 1.

4.2 Test of an Allais Paradox for Social Choice
The Allais paradoxes in choice under risk reveal a disproportionate preference for certainty. The common consequence choice pairs, shown below, have a directly analogous
structure to the Allais common consequence paradox for choice under risk.

The common consequence pairs involve a choice between assigning $3 each to ten
people or assigning $5 to ve people, $3 to four people, and $0 to one person (pair
1) and a choice between assigning $3 to six people or $5 to ve people (pair 2). The
allocations in each pair share a common consequence (four people each receiving $3
in pair 1 and four people receiving $0 in pair 2). A utilitarian planner who maximizes
eciency would prefer B in both choices. A suciently inequity-averse planner (i.e.,
with a suciently concave social welfare function) would prefer A in both choices.
More broadly, any additive social welfare function that strictly prefers A over B in
pair 1 will also strictly prefer A over B in pair 2. The SWUP model in (5, 6) predicts
a choice of A in pair 1 due to the salience of one person receiving $0 instead of $3
under allocation B, and a choice of B in pair 2, since the comparison of $3 versus $5
is more salient than allocating money to 5 versus 6 people.

4.3 Test of a Common Ratio Eect for Social Choice
The common ratio eect is another violation of independence.

In our experiment,

choices to elicit a common ratio eect are translated to a social choice environment.
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The common ratio choice pairs above, involve a choice between assigning $2 to each
of ten people or $5 to each of ve people (pair 1) and a choice between assigning $2 to
each of two people or $5 to one person (pair 2). Thus, the number of people receiving
a payo in the pair 2 allocations is one-fth (a common ratio) of the number of people
in the pair 1 allocations. A utilitarian decision maker who maximizes eciency would
prefer B in both choices. An inequity-averse planner with a suciently concave social
welfare function would prefer A in both choices. More broadly, any additive social
welfare function that strictly prefers A over B in pair 1 will also strictly prefer A
over B in pair 2. The SWUP model in (5, 6) predicts a choice of A in pair 1 and a
choice of B in pair 2. The SWUP model thus predicts an equality eect in which social
planners deviate from standard theory by exhibiting a disproportionate preference for
eliminating inequality. This behavior is analogous the Allais certainty eect in which a
decision maker deviates from expected utility theory by exhibiting a disproportionate
preference for eliminating risk.

4.4 Test of a Framing Eect for Social Choice
We next provide a test of the property of frame invariance for social choice. A novel
prediction of SWUP is that a decision maker's policy preferences (e.g., between a
more ecient or a more equitable allocation) will be subject to systematic framing
eects.

Consider for example the two allocation decisions below.

These alignment

framing eect pairs each involve a choice between assigning $12 to 2 people, $5 to
4 people and $0 to 4 people versus assigning $13 to 2 people, $5 to 4 people and
$0 to 4 people.

A preference for eciency predicts the choice of B and inequity

aversion predicts the choice of A. Note that both choice pairs represent exactly the
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same decision, so that dierences in behavior cannot be explained by any standard
model of social preferences. In contrast, SWUP predicts a systematic framing eect
in which A is chosen over B in Pair 1 since $12 versus $0 is the salient comparison in
that pair, and B is predicted to be chosen over A in Pair 2 since $13 versus $12 is the
salient comparison in that pair. This behavior is analogous to `hidden zero' framing
eects that have been observed for risk (Bordalo et al., 2012; Leland, Schneider, and
Wilcox, 2018) and time (Magen et al., 2008).

The framing eect predicted by SWUP especially applies to agents who do not have
strong preferences for one policy over another. The `median voter' in a close political
election may have particularly weak preferences between candidates or policies. An
implication of the framing eect predicted by SWUP is then that the election outcome
may hinge on the frame adopted by the median voter. If one views the two framing
eect pairs as analogous to two advertisements, SWUP implies that informationally
equivalent ads can bias voters toward a more ecient or a more equitable policy by
focusing the voters' attention on comparisons that favor one policy over the other.

4.5 Test of Scale Invariance for Social Choice
A general property of a power social welfare function is scale invariance.

Scale in-

variance is also implied by SWUP from (5) with the parameter-free salience function
in (6). In contrast, under the BGS salience function, for instance with

θ=1,

SWUP

predicts a shift toward more egalitarian allocations as payos are scaled up by a common factor.

Consider the `magnitude eect' pairs shown below.

14

Pair 1 involves a

choice between assigning $5 each to ten people or assigning $50 to one person and
$0 to nine others. Pair 2 is a choice between assigning $0.25 each to ten people or
assigning $2.50 to one person and $0 to the others. A utilitarian planner would be
indierent in both choices. An inequity-averse planner with a power social welfare
function would prefer A in both choices.

The parameter-free SWUP model in (5, 6) also predicts A in both choices and
hence, no magnitude eect.

However, under the more general salience function,

SWUP predicts a magnitude eect for suciently large

θ > 0.

SWUP predicts a choice of A in pair 1 and B in pair 2.

θ=0

and

θ>0

For instance, if

θ = 1,

The distinction between

is more than a dierence in parameter values: It enables us to test

the following property of a salience function in the domain of social choice:

Increasing Proportional Sensitivity:

For any

ab> 0, α > 1, σ(αa,αb) > σ(a,b).

There is an intuitive relationship between increasing proportional sensitivity (IPS)
and the diminishing sensitivity property. Diminishing sensitivity implies that for a
xed absolute dierence, the perceptual system is more sensitive to larger ratios.
The IPS property implies that for a xed ratio, perception is more sensitive to larger
absolute dierences.
When

θ > 0, σv

When

θ = 0, σv

satises diminishing sensitivity but not IPS.

satises both properties.

4.6 Test of a Skewness Eect for Social Choice
The nal property we test is skewness invariance. This enables us to test whether
social preferences depend on the skewness of the distribution of payos in an allocation. Consider, for instance, the skewness eect pairs shown below. Pair 1 involves a
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choice between assigning 7 people $12 and 3 people $11 or assigning 7 people $16 and
3 people $6. Pair 2 involves a choice between assigning 7 people $12 and 3 people
$11 or assigning 7 people $10 and 3 people $20. Option B in pair 1 and option B
in pair 2 share several features in common: They both have the same total value of
$130, they both have the same degree of equality (as measured for instance by the
Gini coecient, the mean absolute deviation, the standard deviation, and the range
of these allocations), and they are compared to the same alternative allocation A.
They also have the same absolute magnitude of skewness. In addition, option A has
the larger minimum payo in both pairs. Thus, pure utilitarian preferences or pure
Rawlsian preferences (that maximize the payo of the least fortunate individual as
suggested by Rawls (1971)) cannot generate a preference for A in one pair and a
preference for B in the other. However, since B is negatively skewed in pair 1 and
positively skewed in pair 2, SWUP predicts a preference for A in pair 1 (where the
comparison between $6 and $11 is salient) and a preference for B in pair 2 (where
the comparison between $20 and $11 is salient). That is, SWUP predicts an aversion
to negatively skewed ecient allocations and a preference for positively skewed ecient allocations, relative to a more equitable allocation. This implication also holds
for a concave power social welfare function, although it does not hold for standard
inequality measures or for utilitarian or Rawlsian preferences.

The skewness eect predicted by SWUP also provides a social choice-based explanation for the widely observed positively skewed wealth distributions across countries
and across time (Behabib and Bisin, 2017). In contrast, utilitarian preferences place
no restrictions on the skewness of a society's wealth distribution, while Rawlsian
preferences lead to a symmetric wealth distribution.
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5

Results

We summarize our main results in Table 1 which displays the distribution of individual choice patterns for each pair of choices. For each pair, the Equality column
contains the proportion of all 100 subjects who consistently chose the more equitable allocation in that pair. For each choice pair, the Eciency column displays
the proportion of all 100 subjects who consistently chose the more utilitarian ecient allocation in that pair. The SWUP pattern column displays the proportion
of all subjects who exhibited the choice pattern predicted by the SWUP model in
(5), using the BGS salience function which predicts systematic deviations from all
ve properties in Section 2. The parameter-free specication of SWUP predicts the
same SWUP patterns as the BGS salience function except that it predicts consistent
egalitarian choices in the magnitude eect pair. The Unexplained column displays
the proportion of all subjects who displayed the opposite form of inconsistency from
the predicted SWUP patterns.

Table 1 also reports Conlisk's (1989) Z-statistic that is designed to test for the
presence of systematic bias in pairs of choice problems and which approximates a
standard normal distribution. Bounds on the corresponding p-values are also shown.
From Table 1 we see that the social choice SWUP model is remarkably successful.
The predictions from the model were generated before collecting the data. Despite
these restrictions, SWUP accurately predicted the majority choice in nine of the
ten allocation decisions under the BGS salience function with

θ=1.

In addition,

the simpler parameter-free specication in (5, 6) correctly predicted the majority
choice in all ten allocation decisions.

Moreover, of the ve principles tested, four

were signicantly violated. Two observations to note from Table 1 are that (i) these
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four eects are highly systematic, with each pattern predicted by the salience model
occurring for between 39 and 56 subjects and the reverse bias occurring for between
5 and 9 subjects, and (ii) for each of these four eects, the predicted pattern is the
modal response, occurring more often than consistent preferences for either utilitarian
eciency or equality.

Only the magnitude eect implied by the IPS property of

salience perception was not observed. Instead, 55 of the 100 subjects chose the more
equitable allocation in both magnitude eect choices, consistent with a concave social
welfare function or with the parameter-free specication of SWUP.

5.1 Patterns of Behavior within Subjects
A more stringent test of the predictions of social choice theory and SWUP in our
experiment is to consider each subject's overall preference pattern to check which
model they are best characterized by.

To investigate this, we consider individual

3

preference patterns across eight choices

 the choice pairs for the framing eect, the

skewness eect, the common consequence eect, and the common ratio eect.
t the social welfare function

αi

was t separately for each

w (ui ) = uiαi ,
subject i and

We

where the inequality aversion parameter
the monetary amounts in each allocation

were used in place of the unknown (and unobservable) utility values for the recipients
of the allocation. We let

αi ∈ (0, 1]

for all

i

so that each subject's social preferences

included the utilitarian social welfare function (αi
through this parameter space for

αi

for each

social welfare function for 100 values of

αi

= 1) as a special case. We searched
subject, i , by computing that subject's

from 0.01 to 1 at 0.01 increments to nd the

maximum number of these eight choices which could be best t for each subject by
some

αi ∈{0.01,0.02,. . . ,1.00}.

We compared these predictions for each subject to the

parameter-free predictions of the salience model. This is a strong test of the salience
model: Across our subject population we t 100 free parameters for the social choice
theory specication (one for each subject) and we compared that to the parameterfree specication of SWUP (from formulas (5) and (6)) which ts zero parameters.
These results are summarized in Table 2 which displays the number of subjects (N)
best t by each model.

Remarkably, of the 100 subjects in the experiment, the

3 The

magnitude eect pair was not used for two reasons: (1) The magnitude eect is not a robust
prediction of SWUP as noted in Section 4.5 in that it does not hold for the parameter-free salience
function, and (2) Both choice alternatives had the same level of eciency and so utilitarianism does
not make a clear prediction for these pairs.
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parameter-free salience model predicts the choices of 42% of subjects strictly better
than the social choice model.

The social choice model predicts the choices of 25%

of subjects strictly better than the salience model, and the two models are tied for
the remaining 33% of subjects. Hence, the salience model has substantially greater
predictive accuracy with substantially fewer parameters. For the social choice model,
there was a set of parameter values that achieved the same best t for each subject.
Of the 100 subjects, 54 had sets of best-tting parameter values that included the
utilitarian case (αi

= 1).

Of these 54 subjects, 14 t better than salience theory, and

an additional 12 were tied with salience theory. Hence, we cannot reject the possibility
that up to 26% of our subjects are utilitarian. At the aggregate level, social choice
theory with subject-specic inequality-aversion parameters best ts 64.75% of the 800
choices, whereas the parameter-free salience model best ts 70.5% of these choices.
This dierence is also signicant (p = 0.032, two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
A parameter-free social choice specication in which all subjects are utilitarian best
ts 49.75% of these choices, not better than random chance.

5.2 Social Welfare Preferences and Cognitive Reection
The cognitive reection test uncovered substantial heterogeneity in the types of social
preferences our subjects exhibited. Since each of the choices in our experiment involved a more egalitarian allocation and a less egalitarian allocation, we computed an
`inequity-aversion' index for each subject dened as the total number of egalitarian
choices a subject made out of all 10 decisions. Since eight choices involved a more
ecient allocation and a less ecient allocation we also computed an eciency index
for each subject dened as the total number of eciency-maximizing choices a subject
made in these eight decisions. We observed a signicant positive correlation between
CRT score and eciency choices (ρ = 0.362, p < 0.001, two-tailed Pearson correlation
test), and a signicant negative correlation between CRT score and inequity-averse
choices (ρ = -0.314, p < 0.002, two-tailed Pearson correlation test).
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6

Consistency with other Experimental Findings

The preceding section demonstrates that the salience model performs well in our
experiment (even though the model's predictions were generated prior to data collection). We now turn briey to other experimental results on social choice to probe
whether the salience model provides a robust explanation of observed social welfare
preferences.

6.1 Inequality Aversion and Eciency Preference
In the following examples of choices made by a social planner between monetary
allocations or between medical treatments, the parameter-free SWUP model in (5,
6) predicts the observed preferences for equality and eciency, as well as observed
behavior that contradicts both of these preferences.

Figure 2 displays two decisions. On the left, SWUP predicts an aversion to inequality when allocating a xed sum of money ($10) between two recipients. In the
choice on the right, SWUP predicts a preference for eciency (allocating $16, $8,
and $5 to three individuals instead of $10, $8, and $1 to those individuals). In this
latter example from Engelmann and Strobel (2004), subjects were in the position of
the recipient who received $8 from either allocation, similar to a situation in which an
impartial social planner allocates resources.

Engelmann and Strobel observed that

over 70% of respondents chose allocation B. In contrast, the Fehr-Schmidt (1999)
model of inequity aversion predicts A to be chosen.

6.2 Medical Treatment Allocation
In a recent experiment (Voorhoeve et al., 2017), participants chose between two treatments, only one of which could be implemented. In the experiment, subjects were
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told that 48 people were initially at a health utility index of 0.95 and 27 were at a
health index of 0.91. Treatment 1 would restore 48 people to perfect health (from
an initial health utility index of 0.95) while Treatment 2 would restore 27 people to
perfect health (from an initial health utility index of 0.91). This choice is shown in
Figure 3 with payos (health utilities) ranked in monotonically decreasing order.

In Figure 3, Treatment 2 maximizes eciency, provides a higher payo to the
worst-o group (as advocated by Rawls, 1971) and results in more equitable health
levels (using inequality measures such as mean absolute deviation).

Treatment 2

is thus predicted to be selected by the three major paradigms for optimizing social
welfare. In contrast, the parameter-free specication of SWUP predicts a preference
for Treatment 1 because the dierence between restoring 48 versus 27 individuals to
perfect health is more salient than the 0.91 versus 0.95 health utility indices. In this
respect, SWUP formalizes the eects of salience perception on social welfare. Voorhoeve et al. (2017) observed that the majority of participants preferred Treatment 1.

7

Conclusion

Our experiment identies four anomalies for social choice that parallel classical anomalies for risk and time. These are summarized in Table 3 and include:
1. violations of common consequence independence (the Allais paradox for risk
(Allais, 1953), the cancellation eect for time (Rao and Li, 2011), and the
common consequence eect we observe for social choice).
2. boundary eects which reveal a disproportionate preference for eliminating risk
(e.g., as revealed by the common ratio eect of Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
a disproportionate preference for eliminating time delays prior to a reward (as
revealed by present bias (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991), and a disproportionate
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preference for eliminating inequality (as observed from the common ratio and
common consequence violations in our experiment).
3. a preference for positively skewed distributions over negatively skewed distributions (which manifests as the fourfold pattern for risk (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992), as the bias toward concentration for time (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013),
and as the preference for positively skewed allocations over negatively skewed
allocations that we observe for social choice)
4. violations of frame invariance (the hidden zero framing eect for risk (Bordalo
et al., 2012; Leland, Schneider, and Wilcox, 2018), the hidden zero eect for
time (Magen et al., 2008; Read et al., 2017), and the alignment framing eect
we observe for social choice). Schneider, Leland, and Wilcox (2018) observe a
similar framing eect for choice under ambiguity.

Table 3 thereby provides a compact and yet surprisingly comprehensive summary
of the most robust systematic deviations from the classical models of rational choice.
The behavioral anomalies for risk, time, and social choice in Table 3 are predicted,
respectively, by the SWUP models for risk and time in Leland and Schneider (2018)
and by the analogous SWUP model for social choice developed here.

The salience

eects for social choice may be even more consequential than for risk and time, since
the type of decision maker most susceptible to salience eects (one who is nearly
indierent between two alternatives) is also most likely to determine political elections
and policies on the margin (such as the median voter). Our results may thus suggest
broader implications for the eects of salience on social choice.
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Appendix for Manuscript:
“Salience and Social Choice”
Screen Shots from Experiment
Experimental subjects responded to the choices as presented below. Only one choice was
displayed on a screen at any time. The order of choices and the option that appeared on the
top or bottom row in each choice were both randomized within subjects. The labels in bold
font above each screen shot were not shown to subjects. They are included below to
facilitate comparison to the main text.
Instructions

1

Common Consequence Pair 1

Common Consequence Pair 2

Common Ratio Pair 1

Common Ratio Pair 2

2

Magnitude Effect Pair 1

Magnitude Effect Pair 2

Skewness Effect Pair 1

Skewness Effect Pair 2

3

Alignment Framing Effect Pair 1

Alignment Framing Effect Pair 2

4

Cognitive Reflection Test (Seven-question version from Toplak et al., 2014)

5

